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“'To Sue and Make Noise': Legal Theatricality and Civic Didacticism in 
Boston Legal
[A client asks to be represented in suing the U.S. government
for inactivity in the face of genocide in Darfur.]
Lawyer Lori Colson: “I have a crazy idea. [...] In tort law, you
see a guy lying on the side of the street, you have no obligation
to pull over and help. But if you do pull over, you incur a duty
to complete that rescue, the theory being other would-be
rescuers pass by thinking help is already on the scene. [...] The
United States has declared a war on terrorism. We've talked the
talk when it comes to Sudan. We've even given financial aid.
Our theory of law would be analogous – other countries have
stayed out, thinking America is stepping in when we're not.”
Lawyer Paul Lewiston: “It's not a winner.”
Colson: “But perhaps colorable enough to sue and make noise.”
(Boston Legal, “Schmidt Happens”)
The legal drama episode from which this dialogue is taken depicts an impossible
case: A Sudanese immigrant, who lost most of his family to the violence in Darfur,
wants to sue the U.S. government for failing to intervene in the face of obvious
genocide. The case is unwinnable. Lori Colson's construction of a legal basis for the
case is more than shaky. But neither the client nor his lawyers expect to win the case.
Their proclaimed objective – to “make noise” – pinpoints a significant cultural potential
of litigation, of its 'real' practice in the courtroom and, even more importantly, in its
various forms of mass-medialization and fictionalization: to raise public awareness
about instances of injustice, to educate the public and encourage civic debate.
Legal drama,1 the genre most immediately concerned with narratives of the law and
litigation, figures as one of the most conspicuously didactic genres in contemporary
popular culture. While it could be argued that the genre's very design is didactic –
centering on questions of 'right' and 'wrong,' on the vicissitudes of justice and how it
ought to be achieved – recent legal drama bears witness to a shifting didactic focus,
from primarily moral questions to questions of social justice.2 Current tv legal drama, as
1 In this essay, I will use the term 'legal drama' in the sense of 'courtroom drama,' as referring to
dramatic fictions that show a substantial interest in the themes, characters, and settings of courtroom
litigation. Scholars with a more specific interest in the genre's contours and internal subdivisions often
work with a more nuanced terminology, distinguishing, e.g., courtroom dramas, courtroom
'whodunits,' and legal thrillers as subgenres of legal drama. See Kuzina 79-80; Robinson 32.
2 Elayne Rapping's history of television legal drama would date the beginnings of this shift to the
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cultural scholar Mary Beth Haralovich notes, often employs “the courtroom [as] a venue
to present civic lessons [,...] suspend[ing] verisimilitude to explore issues” (n.pg.). She
further observes that “'[r]ipped from today's headlines,' TV legal drama is more like
docudrama than fiction, as the contending forces of constitutional rights and public
safety are worked through TV legal drama for the civic audience” (n.pg.). In a similar
vein, legal scholar Matthias Kuzina uses the term “social issue courtroom drama” to
characterize the recent wave of films and tv productions that employ courtroom-settings
to engage social and political issues in ways meant to educate the audience and
encourage debate.
The television series Boston Legal (2004-2008) provides for an interesting case
study in this context. On the one hand, the series accentuates the legal drama's didactic
potential and adopts some of the classic conventions by which the genre has performed
its didactic work. On the other hand, the series significantly adapts and amends these
conventions and their didactic operations, seeking to update them for a postmodern
mass culture (which is, in many ways, hostile to didactic orientations of culture). In the
following, I want to use Boston Legal in general, and one of its episodes in particular, to
explore the distinct didacticism of legal fictions. I will argue that this didacticism
specifically exploits the performativity of the legal process that courtroom dramas
represent. Performativity figures as a central yet ambiguous aspect of the law, an aspect
that has played an instrumental role in the formation of media genres organized around
(more or less) fictional representations of the law. While classical legal drama tames
this performativity by way of a realist aesthetic, Boston Legal unleashes the law's
theatricality by amending legal drama with legal comedy. This affects the series's self-
consciously didactic work, outlining a (post-)modernized version of the legal drama's
civic didacticism.
Legal Performativity, Courtroom Drama, and Pop Didacticism
I want to approach the legal drama's distinct didacticism by focusing on how the
1960s, when an increasing number of legal series featured lawyers who “sought to serve the indigent
in the interest of social justice and the righting of broader social injustices” (22). Rapping refers to
series like The Defenders (1961-65), The Law and Mr. Jones (1960-62), Judd for the Defense (1967-
69), and Owen Marshall (1971-74). On a side note, Boston Legal specifically invokes this genealogy
of its genre when one of its episodes, “Son of the Defender,” integrates footage from an episode of
The Defenders.
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genre exploits the law's performativity.3 This performativity or theatricality4 of
courtroom litigation is a much belabored point in legal as well as law-and-the-media
scholarship, which is often argued in terms of an analogy between trials and theater.
Law-and-literature scholar Julie Stone Peters identifies such analogizations as “a trope
central to the history of law and legal commentary” (180). And, she further observes, it
is particularly the nature of courtroom litigation that sustains this trope5: “If law
generally has a secondary textual half-life, the central events of law – trials – (it is
observed) are normally performed before live audiences by those specially trained to
shed their own identities and 'represent' others. Trials are the re-enactment of a conflict
[...] whose essential narrative form is dialogue. They exploit iconic props as crucial
clues to the unfolding of the narrative, and often rely on space, staging, costume, and
spectacle in an attempt to bring back to life the dramatic event they are attempting to
recount” (180-81).
Legal scholar Richard Harbinger's pioneering essay “Trial by Drama” exemplifies
the kind of legal commentary on which Peters bases her diagnosis of a pervasive law-
as-theater trope. Noting that “[a]n adversarial trial is a dramatic thing put to legal use”
(122), Harbinger argues that (criminal) trials are characterized by two layers of drama,
“a play within a play” (ibid.). The “play without,” or “courtroom drama,” is enacted by
the trial's opposing lawyers and consists of their performances (as storytellers) in court:
“The starring attorneys get most of the dialogue and the action and they do most of the
emoting and agonizing. It is only in a legal sense that the defendants or the people win
or lose; in a dramatic sense the attorneys win or lose” (124). The “play within,” or
“crime drama,” concerns the events of the crime which are reconstructed – by way of
two performed, oppositional narratives – in the courtroom. On these two levels, trials
work like theatrical plays in which actors – chiefly the lawyers, but also witnesses,
defendants, etc. – perform in front of an audience – chiefly, but not only, the jury.
This audience-orientation figures as a significant element of the law-as-theater trope,
3 This is not to imply that the structures and conventions of the media in which the law is fictionalized
have no impact on the genre of legal drama, and I will address some of these in the course of my
discussions. The point I want to make with my choice of focus is that there are also factors inherent in
the subject and setting of legal drama that inform its conventions.
4 Julie Stone Peters eloquently discusses the terms 'theatricality,' 'performativity,' and 'performance' as
different ways of talking about one and the same aspect of the law (182-86). The differences among
them rest in the assumptions and interests they bring to the discussion of the law: While
'performativity' especially resonates with the various paradigms of performance studies, 'theatricality'
bears a more diffusely negative connotation, “carr[ying] with it the burden of [...] the 'antitheatrical
prejudice'” (Peters 182). Seeking to distance my discussions from such assumptions and connotations
(which will partly figure as object of my remarks), I will use these terms more or less interchangeably.
5 Thanks to its jury-system, the American legal system seems more conducive to theatricality that other
legal systems.  See Olson and Kayman for a plea for comparative studies of law and culture. 
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an aspect of courtroom litigation (especially of jury trials) specifically singled out to
argue the law's theatricality.6 And while its theatricality seems to generally predispose
the law for medialization and fictionalization, this audience-orientation, in particular,
plays an instrumental role for the law's popular appeal, in ways that ultimately sustain
the myriad forms in which trials are represented in the media. Although lawyers may
gear their courtroom performances toward persuading their juries and judges, these may
not be the only audiences they attract. Discussing high-profile trials, Richard Schechner
speaks of “several audiences surrounding the trial in concentric circles. The courtroom
itself is crowded with spectators and press. The proceedings may be televised” (177).
Schechner's image of the concentric circles suggests that these groups of audiences
watch the courtroom's performances in fundamentally similar ways. Audiences on the
more peripheral of these circles may not be formally called upon to pass a verdict, but
their engagement of the proceedings tends to resemble that of members of the jury: The
pleasure of watching trials rests on a clearly defined suspension of disbelief – to pretend
that the courtroom's performances are targeting oneself and to read these as if
participating in the casting of the verdict. Media representations of the law specifically
exploit the audience-oriented performativity of the courtroom, attracting audiences by
offering them an opportunity to vicariously participate in trials from the privileged,
authoritative position of jury or judge.
This interest in the courtroom's 'original' audience-oriented performativity shapes the
forms and conventions of the law's representations, including those of television legal
drama. Most obviously, it sustains a realist aesthetic. Legal drama especially depends on
the kind of realism that John Fiske deems characteristic for tv fictions in general:
“[Television] presents itself as an unmediated picture of external reality” (21),
concealing the technologies of its own mediality and semiotic apparatus. In addition,
legal drama incorporates all kinds of references to (lay people's notoriously skewed idea
of) the 'real world' of legal practice, from meticulously designed courtroom-sets over
ostentatious reproductions of courtroom protocol to references to real courts and cases.
Carol Clover – whose observations about filmic courtroom dramas pertain to their
televisual versions, as well – notes that the genre she calls 'trial movies' specifically
employs such realist techniques to align its viewers with its diegetic juries. “[T]rial
movies enact the structure and narrative procedures of real trials” (270), thus offering
6 For a most fascinating example, see David Ball's Theater Tips and Strategies for Jury Trials, which
advises lawyers how to improve their persuasiveness by adopting acting and staging strategies from
the theater.
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their audiences reception experiences that present themselves as similar to the reception
experiences of juries in 'real' trials. In addition, the camera-work and editing of these
films encourage an “equation [...] between the diegetic jury and [the films'] spectators”
(260)7 – techniques we will see at work in the Boston Legal episode to be discussed
below. The conventions she identifies foreground the courtroom's 'own' theatricality
(while downplaying the theatricality of the medium film or television by which this
courtroom-theater is represented and fictionalized). They are oriented toward
maximizing the illusion that viewers are participating as jurors in a potentially 'real'
trial.
Clover describes the effect of these conventions as one of intensified viewer
engagement: On-screen courtroom dramas hail their audiences “not as passive
spectators, but as active ones, viewers with a job to do” (257). It is this distinct mode of
audience address, then, that provides for legal drama's didactic potential. The viewers'
'job' to vicariously rule in a film's or episode's case entails learning-work – to learn not
only what happened in the case at hand but also what these happenings mean and why
they matter. Participating in the law's application ('really' or virtually) affords a
quintessentially civic experience, an opportunity to immediately practice one's
citizenship and engage the norms and social organization of one's community. In the
words of Bernard Hibbitts, “[a] properly-conducted trial gives participants the
opportunity and the cathartic satisfaction of approving the law by serving as the
instruments of deliberation and decision. A properly-conducted trial democratizes the
law by calling the community to witness, and by making it collectively responsible for
the law's effectuation” (n.pg.). As we will see, legal drama's didactic operations – its
capacity to thus offer 'civic lessons' – rely on implicating the viewer in the diegetic
courtroom's deliberations.
There is one more aspect of the law's theatricality that informs legal drama's realist
didacticism, and this concerns the ambiguity that theatricality is accorded in legal
discourse. As Julie Stone Peters notes, legal discourse is all but schizophrenic about the
law's performativity: “If law has historically exploited its theatricality – offering an
exemplary spectacle of punishment, awing its subjects with its pomp and ceremony,
replaying the crime, and dramatizing the defendant's story through impersonation – at
the same time it has rebuked or abjured its own theatricality. [... ] Theatricality is
essential to the production of law. At the same time, theatricality in law often bears its
7 See also Jessica Silbey's discussion of the characteristic camera-work in trial films (especially 106-
11).
5
historically negative charge: law is about accessing truth; theater is about presenting
lies” (198). Much legal discourse is invested in disavowing the law's theatricality,
insisting that the law is about texts and facts, and fundamentally different from a theater
associated with “artifice, affectation, excess, melodrama, deception” (Peters 182).
Bernard Hibbitts traces the law's “embarrassment” (n.pg.) about its own theatricality to
the prevailing legal epistemology which “has consciously favored certainty, fixity,
objectivity and rationality, 'scientific' values that seem better represented by text than by
performance” (n.pg.). Both Hibbitts and Peters outline some of the ways in which legal
discourse and practice accordingly try to manage this theatricality, to control and cap its
most seductive and sensationalist aspects: “criminal trials must be public, but not too
public; [...] evidence must be relevant, but not so dramatic as to be too relevant (no
mutilated bodies on the legal stage); testimony must be live, but not be too lively
(witnesses must stay in the box)” (Peters 199).
Paradoxically, classical legal drama shares the law's embarrassment about its own
theatricality – paradoxically because courtroom drama, of course, embodies exactly the
kind of dramatically produced legal fictionality from which legal discourse seeks to
distance itself. Nonetheless, legal drama tends to portray favorably courtrooms that
tame the law's theatricality, and lawyers who abjure acting and directing and instead
serve truth and justice.8 Legal dramas' realist aesthetic draws attention to the issues
involved in their plots while downplaying the (theatrical) means by which these issues
are produced – in the diegetic courtroom and in the film's or episode's representation of
that courtroom. This realist issue-orientation shapes the genre's didacticism, directing
viewers' attention to the social or moral issues in a given case without encouraging them
to reflect on the contingent ways in which these issues are made issues in the fictional
courtroom. What is more, the legal epistemology that underwrites the law's anti-
theatricality further informs the way in which legal drama likes to present its issues: The
“certainty, fixity, objectivity and rationality” (n.pg.) Hibbitts identifies echoes in the
genre's tendency to cast 'truth' and 'justice' as absolute entities. Be its narratives
optimistic or pessimistic about the legal system's propensity to elucidate truth and serve
justice, the concepts of truth and justice underlying these narratives are typically
singular and absolute. Legal drama tends to pit unambiguous right against unambiguous
wrong. It likes to resolve the courtroom's confrontation of opposing narratives of the
same events by singling out one narrative as 'correct' (by associating it with truth and
8 See, e.g., Rapping's survey of tv legal drama (22-47). For an example of a negative portrayal of legal
theatricality, see The Bonfire of the Vanities.
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justice). In courtroom dramas that are affirmative of the legal system, the diegetic
court's ruling typically serves to authorize one of the performed narratives as 'truth' and
to end the trial's epistemological uncertainty by providing narrative closure.
In sum, then, legal drama's didactic operations are significantly shaped by the
troubled theatricality of the law that it fictionalizes. On the one hand, this theatricality
enables the genre's didacticism by allowing its own performed narratives to 'hide'
behind the courtroom's performativity and thus achieve an effect of distinct realism and
immediacy; it engages the viewer by drawing her/him into the diegetic court's
deliberations. On the other hand, the law's theatricality controls legal drama's
didacticism by imparting its uncomfortableness with a theatricality conceived of as
sensationalist and insincere and thus at odds with the law's self-fashioning as founded
on objectivity and normative absolutes; it thereby encourages legal drama to tame the
theatricality of the courtroom, and of its own representations of the court, by means of a
realist aesthetic, and to contain and eventually resolve the narrative ambiguity of a trial
by operating with absolute concepts of truth and justice and by offering authoritative
narrative closure.
Boston Legal, as I will outline in the following, taps into these conventions of the
legal drama but adapts and amends them by integrating scenes that un-tame the law's
theatricality. This, I will argue, considerably affects the series's didactic work. It
specifically targets and unfixes the assumptions about the law's “certainty, fixity,
objectivity and rationality” (Hibbitts) that sustain the anti-theatrical bias in legal
discourse, practice, and fiction. Avowing itself to the law's most theatrical
performativity – and to its own medium's role in encouraging this legal theatricality –
Boston Legal engages its viewers to not only deliberate social issues, but to also
confront the complex and contingent ways in which these become issues.
Boston Legal
I n many ways, Boston Legal is a typical specimen of television legal drama,
adopting not only the conventions of this particular genre but of serial television in
general. At the same time, the series participates in the self-conscious play with and
pushing of such conventions that scholars like Jason Mittell deem characteristic of the
innovative zest of contemporary 'quality' television. The series's self-reflexive
engagement of the law's theatricality has to be seen in the larger context of this trend in
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tv culture.
Boston Legal centers on the professional and private adventures in the high-end law
firm of Crane, Poole, and Schmidt. Especially in its early seasons, episodes tend to be
organized around individual cases – usually two cases that appear to be very different
yet reflect on each other in telling ways; cases tend to be concluded within one episode.
With this structure, the series follows the typical pattern of television series.9 In later
seasons, Boston Legal begins to vary this pattern by developing some cases across
several episodes, an adaptation of narrative structures Mittell associates with tv series'
new interest in narrative complexity, in “shifting [the] balance” between “episodic and
serial forms,” “[r]ejecting the need for plot closure within each episode” (32). As my
discussion of an exemplary episode will illustrate, this is only one of several strategies
by which Boston Legal challenges conventions of narrative closure.
Another aspect in which Boston Legal reflects general conventions of serial
television concerns its use of an ensemble cast, which provides the series with a degree
of diversity and polyvocality. Boston Legal particularly exploits this possibility by
emphasizing its characters' differences. The series's two main protagonists, lawyers
Alan Shore and Denny Crane, are constructed as diametrically opposed characters, who,
nonetheless, are the closest friends. Alan Shore is characterized by his political
liberalism and his – at times cynical, at times rebellious – awareness of how his own
lawyering participates in the manipulation of truth and commodification of justice. By
contrast, Denny Crane, who will play a central role in the episode to be discussed later
on, is an almost grotesquely overdrawn conservative, who adores President Bush, is
very fond of guns and has complicated relationships with several types of minorities.
Crane is cast as direct and uninhibited in venting his conservative opinions and anxieties
as well as in his professional narcissism, a directness cushioned by his coy invocation of
dementia as an excuse for all kinds of inappropriate behavior. There are several other
characters that make the series's ensemble – many of them changing in the course of its
five-year run – that add yet more narrative opportunities and voices. Another character
that will play a role in the episode I want to discuss is Shirley Schmidt, one of the
named partners in Boston Legal's starring law firm, who embodies the law firm's
demand of professionalism and market-orientation, which sometimes conflicts with her
moral conscience and political convictions.10
9 For this and my subsequent observations about the conventions of television series, see, e.g., Butler
(34-40); Newman.
10 My synopsis of these characters, in this brevity, cannot do justice to the actual complexity of their
characterization. It is oriented toward preparing for the roles they will play in the sample episode I
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The pronounced diversity of this ensemble conditions the way in which the series
narrates social issues. Boston Legal likes to present issues from different perspectives,
limiting its dialogism not to the narrative confrontations of the courtroom but extending
it to the series's second main setting, the law firm, thus staging polyvocality as
pervasive to legal and political discourse. The specific issues engaged in the course of
the series's five seasons range from ethical questions of guilt and justice, and the
lawyer's role in affecting or obstructing justice,11 to issues that dominate contemporary
political debate. Among others, the series has addressed the war in Iraq,12 capital
punishment,13 global warming,14 and corporate irresponsibility.15 The polyvocality in the
dramatization of these issues not only rests in the narrative space given to different
perspectives, but, in ways that distinguish Boston Legal from other legal series, it also
extends to the different didactic modes by which these issues are addressed, amending
the conventions of legal drama discussed above with comedic elements. The episode “A
Whiff and a Prayer” shall serve as an example of how these two modes work and relate
to each other, and how they engage the law's troubled theatricality in ways that
(post-)modernize the didacticism of the legal drama genre.
“A Whiff and a Prayer”
The episode was aired in the series's second season and features the customary dual
plot, narrated around two cases. In one of these, Alan Shore defends an old lady charged
with murder; in the other – which shall concern us here – the law firm is hired to defend
a Congressman who is sued by one of his donors for not keeping his campaign-promise
to pass gun-control legislation. The Congressman, we learn, had committed to gun-
control in the course of his electoral campaign, which the plaintiff claims had been a
key factor in his decision to contribute more than $ 2 million dollars. Once in Congress,
the Congressman had to postpone his plans to initiate legislation against assault
weapons when he realized that he could not garner sufficient support for it. The
will discuss.
11 E.g, several episodes in which the lawyers know or assume their clients to be guilty (“The Good
Lawyer”; “The Bride Wore Blood”); the multi-episode story arc in which a woman consults Alan
Shore for guidance how to kill her daughter's acquitted killer in ways that will spare her punishment
(“Hope and Gory”; “The Object of My Affection”)
12 “Witches of Mass Destruction”
13 “Death Be Not Proud”; “The Court Supreme”
14 “Truly, Madly, Deeply”; “Green Christmas”
15 E.g., in “Smoke Signals,” targeting the tobacco industry; “Guardians and Gatekeepers,” targeting the
pharmaceutical industry; “Legal Deficits,” targeting the credit card industry
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plaintiff, meanwhile, lost a family-member to an attack by assault weapons.
The episode stages this case as a difficult one, whose complexities make it a prime
example of the kind of 'civic lessons' that Haralovich sees legal drama potentially
provide. The civic questions it raises include: In how far can and should politicians be
held accountable for their campaign-promises? Do political donors purchase a say in
their donees' political work? What are the ethics involved in weighing one's political
convictions against the realpolitik of day-to-day business (a question not only raised in
the story about the Congressman, but also in the context of lawyer Shirley Schmidt
whose political convictions in favor of gun-control make it difficult for her to argue the
case)? And what factors shape Congressional politics on gun control – is it primarily the
lobbying power of the NRA, or a broader, more deeply ingrained pro-gun culture? The
narrative makes an effort to unfold rather than reduce the complexities involved in these
questions. In the courtroom, it grants narrative space and plausible arguments to
different perspectives on these questions, in ways that emphasize that there are no easy
answers to them. In the law firm, it illustrates the extent to which gun control is a
politically overdetermined issue that provokes powerful ideological reflexes
(Republican Denny Crane shows himself more than eager to argue the case while
Democrat Shirley Schmidt feels unable to represent the firm's client). Finally, the
episode withholds the conventional narrative closure of a court ruling – by the episode's
end, the jury is still in deliberation and the audience never learns how they ruled.
The episode thus leaves the lawyers' oppositional narratives of the case largely
unframed, narratives that unfold in their examination of witnesses and, most centrally,
in their closing arguments. The trial's two closing arguments not only propose different
narratives of what the case is about and how it ought to be judged, they also performed
in widely different ways: While the plaintiff's closing is an exemplary rendition of
lawyering in a conventional legal drama – serious and issue-oriented, disciplining the
courtroom's theatricality to persuade the jury a.k.a. the audience – the defendant's
explodes this tamed theatricality in a rambunctious, openly theatrical performance,
which, despite its violation of lawyerly codes and conventions, becomes strangely
effective.
The plaintiff's closing operates along the conventions of legal drama: His
performance is oriented toward focusing on the issues involved in the case – the
Congressman's prior commitment to gun control, the power of the NRA to influence
political decisions –, toward making the delivering lawyer appear sincere and
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committed to the case he (actually only) 'represents.' While, diegetically, his
performance is geared toward persuading the jury to rule in his client's favor, it also
works to educate the episode's audience, conspicuously discussing the case against the
backdrop of larger political questions:
Like [the defendant] says: “Everybody wants the ban on assault weapons.” The
Democrats. The Republicans. The police. Seventy-eight percent of the public.
And yet, we don't have it. Why? The Senate majority leader has said, and I
quote, “The will of the American people is consistent with letting it expire.” Is
that consistent with your will? With yours? What the hell is going on here? The
NRA has them all terrified! How powerful is this lobby? Senator Kerry, in his
bid to get elected President, was advised that he had to go out and shoot an
animal and to be photographed doing so. He's a wind-surfer for God's sake!
Well, enough is enough. It is time to hold Congress accountable. 30,000 deaths
by firearms every year in this country. And we can't ban assault weapons?
People need them for personal protection? To hunt? And now we actually have
legislation pending in Washington that will literally shield the gun manufacturers
from being sued. Even for negligence. We can sue doctors, big tobacco, asbestos,
but the gun industry gets its own special legislation granting them immunity.
What the hell is going on? Where are our elected officials? This one vowed to
fight the gun industry. Took campaign contributions on the promise that he
would. And what did [the plaintiff] get in return? His sixteen-year-old nephew,
while buying a quart of milk, was mowed down by two AK47s.
The mis-en-scène of the closing employs the kind of techniques Clover discusses as
affecting the audience's identification with the jury: The camera repeatedly shoots from
the jury's position, sometimes from behind or seemingly within the jury-box, literally
putting the viewer in their place. Such shots are intercut with pans across the jurors'
faces, monitoring how the lawyer's arguments are resonating with them and effectively
inviting the viewer to open up to these arguments, as well. On the rhetorical level, the
closing's use of questions and its direct address to the jury / audience further serves to
engage the viewer, to draw her/him into the deliberation of the case and its attendant
political questions.
The defendant's closing – delivered by Denny Crane – works and teaches
differently. In several ways, Crane's performance in court violates the codes and
conventions of legal performativity by being openly, self-consciously theatrical. He
enters the court in costume, dressed up as one of the Minutemen memorialized in U.S.
history for their role in the American Revolution. His entrance is accentuated by a shot
he 'accidentally' releases from the rifle that goes with his costume. Both his costume and
the spectacle of his entrance align Crane's performance with precisely the kind of
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theatricality that the law seeks to disavow. This alignment is further substantiated in the
'argument' he delivers:
It was a shot heard around the world. Remember? Not a punch. Not a stabbing. It
was a shot. To rally the Minutemen to defeat the Red Coats at Lexington. This
nation began with a gun. Will go down with a gun. Or maybe, if we have them,
won't go down at all. 
Let me tell you about assault weapons. The FBI now reports that terrorists are
coming to America to get them because it's easier to procure them here. Now I
ask you, how can we supply terrorists with AK47s and not give them to our own
people? 
[camera cuts to Shirley Schmidt and another colleague who both hide their faces
in their hands.] 
That may sound crazy but part of being an American in the Wild West was we
came armed! It's in the Bill of Sale, for God's sake.
[cut to Shirley Schmidt, who whispers: “Bill of Rights.”]
In our National Anthem, we've got bombs bursting in air, for God's sake. We
drive around with our shotguns on the outside of our pickup so the neighbors
will see them. And – no one talks about this out loud of course, but things might
have turned out differently for the nephew of the plaintiff if he had had his own
automatic weapon. 
First sound of Democracy came from a gun like this one. And that's why the ban
on assault weapons has been allowed to lapse. It's all about our basic civil rights.
It's about democracy. It's about freedom!
[Denny Crane leaves the courtroom to the sound of “Glory, Glory, Hallelujah!”]
Throughout the closing, the camera captures the horror on the faces of his colleagues
and the consternation on the faces of the jurors, underscoring the utter inappropriateness
of Crane's performance to the courtroom setting and to his role as defense attorney. But
by his conclusion, facial expressions suggest that his closing was strangely effective: It
engages the jury / audience not so much by making an argument as, in fact, by
performing one. In its carefully scripted insanity, it outlines that there is an insane pro-
gun culture, widely spread and deeply ingrained in U.S. history, suggesting that this
culture is actually to be blamed, rather than a single Congressman.
Crane's closing, then, employs a different didactic mode: Where the plaintiff's
closing operates by telling, his operates by showing; where the plaintiff's adheres to a
realist aesthetic, seeking to conceal the theatricality of its own construction, Crane's
advertises its theatricality in most spectacular ways. Thus, the two closings – and the
assumptions about legal performativity that they reflect – speak to each other. Denny
Crane's closing throws into relief the performativity of the opposing lawyer's argument,
12
unmasking its more controlled theatricality. Crane's theatrical costume resonates with
the other lawyer's costume – the high-end attorney's tailor-made suit; his use of stage-
effects – the shot from the rifle – resonates with the other's deployment of rhetorical
effects. Together, the dramatic and the comic closing engage the audience to not only
deliberate the issues of the case but also the ways in which such issues are narrated,
performed, 'sold' to them. The episode dramatizes a social issue without reducing it to a
hermetically narrated lesson. It encourages not only knowledge about this issue but also
literacy in reading and evaluating narratives of the issue.
To conclude, the dynamics of legal performativity provide a productive focus for an
exploration of the courtroom drama's distinct didacticism. The law's theatricality, I have
argued, both enables and controls the genre's didactic potential. Boston Legal makes for
an instructive case study of how a contemporary legal tv series tries to (post-)modernize
this didacticism by exploiting the ambiguity of legal theatricality: The series combines
the tamed, issue-oriented performativity of the classical legal drama with a legal
comedy that un-tames the law's theatricality. It thereby opens up new possibilities for
legal fictions to 'make noise,' to recruit the fictional courtroom as “a venue to present
civic lessons” (Haralovich n.pg.).
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